Terrorism has long been a brutal instrument used by authoritarian regimes, extremist groups, and intelligence agencies to achieve political and strategic objectives. It thrives on fear, coercion, and the suppression of opposition, often targeting those who challenge the status quo. While many associate terrorism with non-state actors, history shows that powerful states and their agencies have also employed these tactics to eliminate adversaries and maintain influence. During the Cold War, the United States and its allies, as well as the Soviet Union, engaged in covert operations that blurred the lines between warfare, espionage, and outright political violence. One of the most debated examples is the assassination of U.S. President John F. Kennedy, who was navigating a tense geopolitical landscape, particularly in relation to Cuba and the Soviet Union. While his murder remains a topic of speculation and conspiracy, it highlights how high-stakes politics often intertwine with violence. As the Cold War neared its end, Washington adjusted its foreign policy, including its stance on terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism—two elements it had previously exploited for strategic gains. The sudden death of General Zia-ul-Haq, Pakistan’s military ruler and a key U.S. ally in the Afghan jihad against the Soviets, remains shrouded in mystery. His elimination coincided with a shift in U.S. regional priorities, reinforcing the perception that global powers have often manipulated terrorism to serve their changing interests.
State-sponsored terrorism remains one of the most alarming dimensions of modern geopolitical conflicts. From Stalin’s ruthless elimination of political rivals, including the assassination of Leon Trotsky in Mexico, to the operations of intelligence agencies like Israel’s Mossad, the CIA, and Pakistan’s ISI, the use of covert violence has shaped global power struggles. Israel, for instance, has employed targeted assassinations as a counterterrorism strategy, as seen in the killing of Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, who was struck by an airstrike after morning prayers. The interplay between terrorism, intelligence operations, and political objectives continues to shape conflicts worldwide. In Afghanistan, decades of war, foreign interventions, and internal rivalries have made the country a battleground for both local insurgents and global intelligence operations. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for addressing terrorism beyond its surface-level manifestations and recognizing its deep-rooted political and strategic drivers.
The assassination of Dr. Najibullah, the former president of Afghanistan, stands as a stark example of state-sponsored terrorism. His brutal execution, widely believed to have been orchestrated with the backing of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) under General Hamid Gul, underscores how intelligence agencies have long played a decisive role in shaping Afghanistan’s political landscape. His killing was not just an act of retribution but a calculated move to eliminate a figure who could have posed a challenge to the shifting power dynamics of the region.
Policymakers who advocate for war and occupation often attempt to associate terrorism primarily with oppressed peoples, diverting attention from the role of states in fostering violence for political gain. In the United States and other Western countries, analysts frequently attribute terrorism to social grievances such as poverty, xenophobia, and unemployment. However, history reveals a more complex reality. Up until the late 20th century, the U.S. openly referred to various militant groups as “freedom fighters,” particularly when their actions aligned with American geopolitical interests. Some of these groups, once supported as part of an “Islamic awakening,” would later be labeled as terrorist organizations when their agendas no longer served U.S. objectives.
Far from being a product of mere ideological extremism, U.S.-led covert operations have often been deliberate policy decisions made at the highest levels of government. At times, American presidents have personally ordered intelligence agencies to carry out assassinations and covert actions. In Ghost Wars, journalist Steve Coll recounts how President Bill Clinton harbored doubts about the CIA’s operational effectiveness, particularly after the agency failed in its 1996 attempt to assassinate Saddam Hussein—an operation that ended in failure and embarrassment for the White House. Similarly, Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, in American Foreign Policy, highlight how concerns over covert operations escalated in the mid-1970s when U.S. Senate hearings, led by Frank Church, exposed CIA-backed assassination plots targeting foreign leaders. These revelations confirmed that political violence was not the domain of insurgents alone but was actively employed by powerful states.
In the East, monarchs and political figures have historically been overthrown or eliminated through such covert means, often driven by power struggles within royal courts. Afghanistan, a battleground for competing empires, has long been subjected to political violence engineered by external powers. Since the British colonial expansion into the Indian subcontinent, terrorism and targeted killings were systematically used to suppress anti-colonial resistance. The British, when unable to defeat Afghan freedom fighters through direct military confrontation, resorted to assassination and subterfuge. Historical records document numerous examples of British-orchestrated assassinations in Afghanistan. Abdullah Khan Achakzai, a prominent anti-colonial leader, was targeted and killed. British William MacNaughton based in Kabul conspired to eliminate Wazir Mohammad Akbar Khan, first through failed attempts at direct confrontation and later through poisoning. General Sale, a British military commander, reportedly paid a servant a small sum—1,000 Rupees, worth less than £3 today—to shoot Akbar Khan, leaving him wounded. An Indian physician later poisoned him, delivering the final blow to a leader who had fiercely resisted colonial rule. These historical events illustrate how terrorism has been wielded not just by non-state actors but by powerful nations and their intelligence agencies. Whether in the form of covert assassinations or state-backed militancy, political violence has remained a tool of control, shaping Afghanistan’s history and its ongoing struggle for sovereignty.
Throughout Afghanistan’s history, political assassinations have played a central role in shaping the country’s leadership struggles, often at the hands of both domestic operatives and foreign intelligence agencies. Historical records identify several notorious figures who acted as agents for colonial and occupying forces, betraying their own people in the process. Among them was Abdul Aziz, who assassinated Abdullah Khan Achakzai, and his nephew Mohammadullah, who poisoned Mir Masjidi Khan—both revered anti-British resistance fighters. Another agent, Payenda, was responsible for shooting Wazir Akbar Khan. These individuals were recruited as operatives of the British East India Company, highlighting how external powers used local collaborators to weaken Afghan resistance.
The British colonial authorities not only relied on individual operatives but also institutionalized assassination as a tool of control. They placed a bounty on Naib Aminullah Khan Logari, one of Afghanistan’s most respected freedom fighters, further cementing their use of political violence as a means to suppress anti-colonial movements. At the time, terrorism was considered a legitimate state instrument, wielded to eliminate those who opposed imperial rule. This pattern of state-sponsored violence extended beyond colonial actors. Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, known as the “Iron Amir,” ran one of the most brutal intelligence networks in Afghan history, likely with British support. His rule was marked by systematic purges, targeting anti-British resistance fighters as well as his personal political rivals. His reign demonstrated how authoritarian leaders have historically resorted to political assassinations to consolidate power.
When absolute rule crushed organized political opposition, those who sought change were left with few options. As history has shown, suppression often breeds resistance, and in Afghanistan, targeted assassinations became a tool of last resort for those who found no other means to challenge tyranny. One such example was the assassination of Amir Habibullah Khan, whose violent crackdown on constitutionalists and intellectuals, coupled with internal palace rivalries, eventually led to his murder in his sleep. Similarly, the rise of Mohammad Nader Shah’s authoritarian rule saw the systematic suppression of opposition forces, particularly intellectuals, educators, and anti-colonial activists. His reign sparked targeted assassination attempts aimed at resisting his brutal governance and demonstrating that Afghanistan’s youth had not surrendered to oppression. Afghan students and intellectuals—many radicalized by the political turmoil—turned to violent action. Sayed Kamal, a student in Germany, assassinated Sardar Abdul Aziz, the brother of Nader Khan. Mohammad Nazir Munshizadah, a teacher at Najat School, attempted to assassinate the British ambassador at the embassy, killing several staff members instead. Abdul Khaliq, a student, eventually succeeded in assassinating Nader Khan himself.
Interestingly, Nader Khan was no stranger to the politics of assassination. Historical accounts suggest that he had once plotted to eliminate former King Amanullah Khan while he was performing Hajj. According to The Afghan Struggle in Stalin’s Era, the Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs warned Amanullah Khan of an imminent assassination attempt. The plan was reportedly orchestrated by Nader Khan’s close aide, Allah Nawaz Khan—a known British agent from Multan—who was tasked with ensuring Amanullah Khan’s elimination. Even after securing the throne in Kabul, Nader Khan’s rule remained entangled in conspiracies and covert power struggles.
As Afghanistan entered the so-called “Decade of Democracy” (1963–1973), the political landscape began to shift. Leftist progressive movements gained momentum, particularly among students, intellectuals, and laborers in universities, factories, and industrial sectors. However, as these movements expanded, so too did counterforces driven by religious fundamentalism and political violence. These forces, which had been largely weakened after the fall of the fundamentalist Saqawi regime, were revived with backing from Western and Pakistani intelligence agencies. This period saw the rise of figures like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, whose violent methods quickly became notorious. Known for his ruthless approach, Hekmatyar frequently resorted to intimidation, using knives and pistols to eliminate his opponents—even as a student at Kabul University.
By 1971, as the Afghan government sought to curb the growing influence of progressive student movements through restrictive education laws, protests erupted across the country. Kabul University became a hotbed of political activism, with faculty and students leading demonstrations against the government’s attempts to silence dissent. The rise of political violence in this period was not incidental—it was the direct result of decades of suppression, foreign intervention, and ideological warfare that had turned Afghanistan into a battleground of competing interests.
The use of terrorism as a tool for political control and elimination of rivals has been a persistent theme in Afghanistan’s history. In the early 1970s, as ideological battles intensified between Islamist and leftist movements, political violence escalated. One of the most infamous figures in this era was Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, known for his ruthless methods. During the winter of that period, a series of speeches were held at the Sayed Jamaluddin Afghan Library Hall of Kabul University. Prominent scholar and professor Ali Mohammad Zahma delivered a speech on culture and the need for progress. As he exited the hall, Hekmatyar confronted him, accusing him of attacking Afghan culture. Zahma, unshaken, responded, “Step aside, boy. I know you have a knife and a pistol, and I can defend myself.” This exchange symbolized the deep ideological and violent clashes unfolding at the time.
By 1972, Hekmatyar’s violent tactics became more apparent. During Eid prayers in Pul-e-Khumri, he attempted to stab Sulaiman Layeq, but Bashir Roigar—who later became Minister of Information and Culture—was injured while protecting Layeq. That same year, during a protest at Kabul University, Hekmatyar assassinated Seyedal Sokhandan, a leading member of the Sholay-e-Jawid (New Democratic Movement). Though arrested, he was later released when Prime Minister Mohammad Musa Shafiq—who had sympathies for Islamist factions—came to power. After Sardar Mohammad Daoud’s coup, Hekmatyar fled to Pakistan, where he continued his militant activities. By his own admission, he later orchestrated the assassination of Mir Akbar Khyber, a senior leader of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).
His violent influence continued into the Mujahideen era. BBC journalist Mirwais Jalil was assassinated after conducting an interview with Hekmatyar in Char Asiab during the Mujahideen wars. Meanwhile, Ahmad Shah Massoud’s urban guerrilla fighters also engaged in bombings and targeted killings. During the Mujahideen rule over Kabul, factional conflicts led to high-profile assassinations. Karim Shadan, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, was abducted from his home and killed. General Jamaluddin Omar, a professor at the Military Academy, was kidnapped from a mosque in Khair Khana for speaking out against Mujahideen infighting. Hours later, his family was informed to collect his body from the banks of the Khair Khana stream.
Terrorism also extended beyond Afghanistan’s borders. During the factional infighting, targeted killings of Afghan political figures in Peshawar became a tool of power struggles. Assassinations of figures like Abdul Ahad Karzai, Abdul Rahim Chenzy, and Professor Sayed Bahauddin Majrooh were attributed to Hezb-e-Islami and Pakistan’s ISI, reflecting how external intelligence agencies manipulated Afghan leaders for their own strategic gains.
The United States played a role in embedding terrorist ideologies within Mujahideen ranks during the Soviet-Afghan War. The Jihad Cultural Center in Peshawar—funded by an American organization—introduced school textbooks that taught Afghan children mathematical operations through images of killing Soviet and Afghan soldiers. This militarization of education contributed to a deeply entrenched culture of violence that later backfired. Leaders like Ahmad Shah Massoud and Burhanuddin Rabbani, both products of this radicalized environment, were themselves assassinated by extremist factions that had emerged from the Mujahideen era.
The evolution of terrorism in Afghanistan followed a distinct trajectory: from the Jihad against the Soviets to Mujahideen factional conflicts, the rise of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, U.S. military intervention, the resurgence of the Taliban, and the emergence of ISIS. Each phase made Afghanistan’s security situation more precarious, affecting daily life across the country, from villages to major cities.
9/11 and the Global War on Terror
The September 11, 2001, attacks marked a pivotal moment in global history, leading to significant shifts in Afghanistan’s political and security landscape. In response to these attacks, the United States and its allies initiated Operation Enduring Freedom, aiming to dismantle al-Qaeda and remove the Taliban from power. The initial phase of the intervention saw the rapid displacement of the Taliban regime and the establishment of a new Afghan government. Despite these efforts, the Taliban regrouped and launched an insurgency, leading to prolonged conflict. Over the years, Afghanistan witnessed various phases of violence, including Tehrek Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and the rise of ISIS-K, an affiliate of the Islamic State, which carried out numerous attacks in the country and region. The U.S. withdrawal in 2021, as part of an agreement with the Taliban, led to the rapid collapse of the Afghan government and the Taliban’s return to power. This shift has raised concerns about Afghanistan once again becoming a haven for terrorist organizations. Recent reports indicate that al-Qaeda is experiencing a resurgence, with figures like Hamza bin Laden, son of Osama bin Laden, allegedly taking on leadership roles to avenge his father’s death. Furthermore, the Islamic State has claimed responsibility for attacks in the country, including suicide bombings in Kabul, signaling its ongoing presence and threat in the region. The evolving dynamics in Afghanistan underscore the complex interplay between local insurgencies and global terrorist networks, necessitating continuous monitoring and adaptive strategies to address emerging threats.
The two-decade long war claimed tens of thousands of lives across different sectors of Afghan society. According to the Watson Institute’s Costs of War Project, approximately 46,319 Afghan civilians were killed due to direct violence, not accounting for deaths caused by famine, displacement, or healthcare system collapse. Afghan security forces also suffered heavy losses, with 69,095 personnel killed, while at least 52,893 opposition fighters, including Taliban insurgents and other militant groups, died in combat. The actual figures of casualties are reportedly higher than those reported. The international coalition also faced significant casualties. The United States lost 2,325 military personnel, with 20,149 wounded in action. U.S. contractors accounted for an additional 3,917 deaths. NATO and other allied forces suffered 1,144 fatalities, reflecting the high toll on foreign troops deployed in Afghanistan.
The financial burden of the war was staggering. The United States alone spent an estimated $975 billion on military operations, security assistance, and veteran care. However, when factoring in long-term obligations such as healthcare and benefits for veterans, total costs could exceed $2 trillion. Other NATO members also made significant financial contributions. Germany’s involvement in Afghanistan is estimated to have cost between €12.5 billion and €47 billion, covering military expenditures and aid programs. These figures highlight the extensive economic strain placed on coalition members over the course of the conflict.
Despite the extensive investment in human and financial resources, the war ended with the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 following the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces. The rapid collapse of the Afghan government raised serious concerns about the country’s stability and the future of counterterrorism efforts. The resurgence of terror threats remains a pressing issue.
In this prolonged conflict, each actor employed different methods of warfare. The Taliban used tactics such as suicide bombings, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), roadside bombs, targeted assassinations, the use of civilian homes as shields against security forces, attacks on government buildings and NGOs accused of harmful activities, coercion and intimidation of the public, beheadings and executions in front of family members, extrajudicial killings and the destruction of schools, bridges, public property, hospitals, and other development projects. Allegations have been made against Afghan security forces and international troops concerning the use of excessive force and potential war crimes. A public inquiry revealed that UK special forces may have executed suspected Taliban members instead of detaining them during night raids in Afghanistan from 2010 to 2013. Testimony from UK special forces witnesses suggested frustrations with inadequate detention processes led soldiers to take the law into their own hands. The Ministry of Defence pledged support for the inquiry and action against any wrongdoing.
Terrorism and political violence in Afghanistan have evolved over centuries, influenced by internal power struggles, foreign interventions, and shifting global agendas. From colonial assassinations to Cold War covert operations, and from Mujahideen rivalries to modern insurgencies, Afghanistan has remained at the center of geopolitical conflicts. Addressing terrorism in Afghanistan requires a comprehensive approach that goes beyond military solutions. A sustainable strategy should focus on strengthening governance, fostering economic development, and addressing ideological extremism at its roots. Additionally, international actors must recognize their role in past conflicts and work towards stabilizing the region through diplomatic and non-military means. Ultimately, Afghanistan’s long-term security depends on breaking the cycle of political violence, ensuring accountability for past conflicts, and creating an environment where terrorism is no longer used as a tool for power struggles. Only through a combination of internal reforms and responsible international engagement can Afghanistan move towards lasting peace and stability.