By Shuaib Mehran and Tariq Jahan
Bagram Airfield has been more than a military facility. Built by the Soviet Union and later expanded by the United States, it became the nerve center of the international coalition during the two-decade war in Afghanistan. Since the U.S. withdrawal in 2021, its capture by the Taliban has been more symbolic than operational. For the Taliban, it represents the “defeat” of 40+ countries (as they describe); for the United States, it is a reminder of unfinished business: counterterrorism.
Recent remarks by Donald Trump about “taking back Bagram” have revived debate about whether the U.S. might seek to re-establish a presence there. This raises fundamental questions about Afghanistan’s stability, and the risks of renewed insurgency and external intervention. Afghans themselves are divided. For some, a U.S. return would only bring more conflict and foreign interference, adding to the decades of instability they have already endured. For others, it is seen as a blow to Taliban rule and perhaps a chance to put the country back on a path toward progress, opportunity, and development.
Unlike some countries that host U.S. military bases without destabilizing effects, Afghanistan’s fragility makes foreign troop presence disruptive. Between 2001 and 2021, external forces not only fueled the conflict but also created openings for regional actors to inflame divisions. The lesson we learn is that foreign military presence is rarely neutral, and often destabilizing, unless tied to Afghan-led and Afghan-centered objectives. For some Afghan elites, the U.S.–China rivalry looks like it was a golden opportunity. In reality, this assumption feels detached from the country’s harsh realities. Without political cohesion and strong institutions, the idea that Afghanistan could cleverly balance global powers and turn rivalry into prosperity sounds more like wishful thinking than a workable strategy.
The U.S. justification for regaining Bagram is framed around counterterrorism. Yet this rationale is vague and unconvincing. Who exactly is the U.S. targeting? Where are these “terrorists” located, inside Afghanistan or in the region? And what strategy is Washington proposing to confront them? If the “terrorists” are inside Afghanistan, how can the U.S. be confident of defeating them when the entire international coalition failed to eliminate terrorism in twenty years, whether through force or negotiation? If the terrorists are outside Afghanistan, then U.S. re-access to Bagram would clearly risk reopening Afghanistan to both malign non-state actors and unfriendly regional governments. Washington’s shifting and often contradictory objectives are well documented. These goals primarily served U.S. interests, frequently at the expense of Afghan priorities. In practice, international narratives were consistently elevated above Afghan voices. So, if Bagram is retaken, it risks reproducing the same pattern, prioritizing U.S. security over Afghan peace.
For the Taliban, Bagram embodies both opportunity and danger. Handing it to the United States could offer recognition and a degree of international legitimacy, yet this move would come at high costs. Cooperation with Washington would undermine the group’s consistent narrative of expelling occupiers, and hardline factions, particularly those based in Kandahar, may resist violently, exposing internal fractures. Such a deal, without fundamental changes in governance, would impose a heavy price on Afghans. Critically, Taliban foot soldiers who have long been told they were fighting against foreign invaders may feel betrayed, deepening mistrust within the movement. Thus, even if an agreement with Washington were to bring recognition, it would simultaneously erode Taliban cohesion and legitimacy.
Two decades of counterterrorism and counter-insurgency interventions have left Afghan society exhausted. Many civilians feel both betrayed by international actors and failed by political leaders. While most Afghans do not support the Taliban and their retrogressive policies, they are also ambivalent about a renewed foreign military footprint. There is little appetite among ordinary Afghans for another period of foreign boots on the ground, precisely because past presences brought more violence and disruption than sustained, systematic improvements. Any proposal to re-take Bagram will therefore face public skepticism. It risks being perceived not as a security measure for Afghans, but as a reprise of external decision-making in which Afghans have little voice.
Bagram’s future is not just a U.S.–Taliban matter; regional states view the base through the lens of competition with Washington. Should the Taliban give access to the United States, neighboring countries would recalibrate their strategies. China, Russia and Iran could respond by supporting anti-Taliban elements and creating insecurity. Pakistan, long a central power broker, could choose to quietly facilitate U.S. moves but would likely hedge its bets by maintaining ties with competing Taliban factions. These dynamics risk reigniting proxy competition that has historically destabilized Afghanistan, once again turning the country into a theatre for regional rivalries.
Retaking Bagram is inseparable from great-power competition. From this vantage, re-establishing a presence at Bagram would primarily serve U.S. geopolitical interests rather than the welfare of Afghan civilians. Regional governments will monitor any U.S. moves and are likely to exploit opportunities to counterbalance American influence, including by supporting rival Afghan actors. In this zero-sum regional environment, ordinary Afghans are the principal losers: great-power maneuvering will be conducted at their expense, perpetuating proxy competition that has historically undermined Afghan stability.
Two broad scenarios can be imagined.
Agreement and U.S. return: U.S. presence at Bagram through a deal with the Taliban would entrench Taliban rule abroad but weaken them at home. It could buy them recognition but at the expense of group cohesion and credibility.
No agreement and U.S. force: A unilateral U.S. attempt to seize the base would be militarily feasible but politically disastrous. It could trigger internal chaos, empower warlords, and invite regional intervention. While it might weaken or even topple the Taliban, it risks plunging Afghanistan back into factionalism.
There is, however, another possibility: rhetoric without action. Just as past provocative claims, from “buying Greenland” to suggesting Canada could become the 51st state, talk of retaking Bagram may seem little more than a verbal threat. In this sense, it could be less about a military return and more about pressuring the Taliban to comply with the Doha commitments. Or, Trump may be trying to signal that not all rhetoric remains unimplemented, using the “retaking Bagram” claim to demonstrate resolve.
In all scenarios, Afghanistan pays the price. U.S. military return to Bagram, whether negotiated or imposed, risks reigniting instability, provoking regional actors, and repeating past mistakes. For effective, enduring counterterrorism and tackling security challenges, it is imperative to empower and work with Afghans. Therefore, any engagement with foreign governments, whether bilateral or multilateral, can only serve common interests if undertaken through a legitimate, effective, inclusive, and representative Afghan government. Without such a political framework, U.S. re-access to Bagram Airfield risks repeating the violence and instability that has plagued the country for decades.
About the authors
Shuaib Mehran works as a senior analyst at ACSTD, focusing on regional security and peacebuilding.
Tariq Jahan is a PhD student at the University of St Andrews, researching terrorism and insurgency.
Disclaimer
Opinions expressed here are the authors’ own and do not represent ACSTD.